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       DEBRA S. TODD (ARGUED) 
       Todd & Associates 
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        Suite 1-C 
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        Attorney for Appellant 
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       WILLIAM J. ROGERS (ARGUED) 
       Thomson, Rhodes & Cowie 
       Two Chatham Center, Suite 1010 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15219-3499 
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        of America 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we must determine whether the term 
"beneficiary," as defined under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. S 1002(8), 
includes partner-employers who are designated to receive 
benefits under an "employee welfare benefit plan."1 We 
conclude that it does. Accordingly, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
Janice Bowers Wolk is an attorney and former corporate 
tax partner at the Pittsburgh law firm of Eckert, Seamans, 
Cherin & Mellot ("Eckert Seamans" or "thefirm"). Since 
1978, Eckert Seamans has provided its employees with 
disability insurance coverage under a group long term 
insurance policy issued by UNUM Life Insurance Company 
of America ("UNUM"). Originally, the policy did not provide 
disability coverage for the firm's partners. However, on 
December 21, 1990, Eckert Seamans replaced the existing 
policy with a new policy that continued disability coverage 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. ERISA defines an "employee welfare benefit plan" as: 
 
       any plan, fund, or program which was . . . or is . .. established 
or 
       maintained by an employer . . . for the purpose of providing for 
its 
       participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of 
       insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or 
       benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, 
disability, 
       death or unemployment . . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. S 1002(1). 
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for the firm's employees and added coverage for the firm's 
partners (the "1990 Policy").2 
 
In May 1990, Wolk was diagnosed with chronic fatigue 
syndrome -- a debilitating illness that causes extreme 
fatigue, general flu-like symptoms and difficulty with 
concentration. Through 1992, Wolk's condition deteriorated 
to the point where she could no longer function as a 
partner at the firm. As a result, Wolk terminated her 
partnership effective March 31, 1993. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Wolk applied to UNUM for disability 
benefits pursuant to the 1990 Policy. UNUM approved 
Wolk's application and commenced disability payments 
effective April 1, 1993. The payments continued without 
incident until March 23, 1995, at which time, UNUM 
informed Wolk that it had determined that she was no 
longer disabled and that it would terminate her benefits 
effective March 27, 1995. 
 
On February 27, 1996, Wolk filed suit against UNUM in 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania. The complaint alleged a variety state-law 
claims, including breach of contract, bad faith, and breach 
of good faith and fair dealing.3 That same day, UNUM 
notified Wolk that it was reversing its decision to deny her 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Under the 1990 Policy, partners and the executive director of the firm 
were designated as Class One of the defined eligible classes. Associates 
and certain other professional employees were designated as Class Two. 
All other employees were designated as Class Three. Partners paid the 
entire cost of their disability insurance coverage. No contribution was 
required from the firm's Class Two and Class Three employees. 
 
3. More specifically, Wolk alleges that UNUM terminated her benefits 
without providing any prior indication of its intention, or of a need for 
additional information or testing concerning her condition. Wolk also 
maintains that despite her repeated requests, UNUM failed to adequately 
explain the reason for the termination of benefits. Further, she asserts 
that UNUM engaged in a consistent pattern of bad faith, which included 
its failure to conduct a good faith investigation into the facts of her 
claim. Finally, Wolk contends that UNUM "unnecessarily dragged out the 
`investigation' of her claim causing her to go without the disability 
benefits to which she was entitled for fourteen months, and to incur 
substantial attorneys' fees in her struggle to compel UNUM to reinstate 
her benefits." Appellant's Brief at 12. 
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benefits. On May 22, 1996, UNUM resumed Wolk's 
disability payments and issued her a check for back benefits.4 
Presently, Wolk receives all monthly benefits from UNUM, 
as well as disability benefits from the Social Security 
Administration. 
 
On December 6, 1996, UNUM filed a motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that ERISA preempted Wolk's 
state-law claims. On March 31, 1998, the District Court 
granted UNUM's motion for summary judgment, finding 
that partner-employers who share coverage under a 
common disability insurance policy with employees are 
"beneficiaries" as defined in ERISA. Thus, the District Court 
held that Wolk's state-law claims against UNUM were 
subject to ERISA's preemptive provisions. In so holding, the 
District Court granted Wolk leave to amend her complaint 
to assert an ERISA cause of action. On June 22, 1998, the 
District Court granted Wolk's motion to certify its March 
31, 1998 order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1292(b), and we granted leave to appeal. 
 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1292(b). We review a District Court's grant of 
summary judgment de novo. See Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 
1291, 1294-95 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
II. 
 
Before we turn to the dispute, it is important to note the 
areas of agreement between Wolk and UNUM. First, the 
parties agree that the 1990 Policy is an "employee welfare 
benefit plan" as defined in ERISA, 29 U.S.C.S 1002(1). 
Second, it is undisputed that Wolk, in her complaint, 
alleges that UNUM unlawfully deprived her of benefits to 
which she was entitled under the 1990 Policy. Third, the 
parties acknowledge that ERISA provides the exclusive 
remedy for those covered by an ERISA plan who seek to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. UNUM delivered a check to Wolk in the amount of $59,374.39, 
representing benefits from March 27, 1995 through May 27, 1996, less 
offsetting Social Security disability benefits. On June 20, 1996, UNUM 
issued Wolk a check in the amount of $3,197.50, representing interest 
on her back benefits at the rate of six percent. 
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enforce their rights under such a plan. See 29 U.S.C. 
S 1144(a). 
 
However, the parties diverge on the question of whether 
Wolk, as a partner-employer of Eckert Seamans, is 
authorized to bring a civil action under ERISA. Wolk argues 
that because a law firm partner is an employer, not an 
employee, she cannot be a "participant" or"beneficiary" of 
an ERISA plan, and thus is not eligible to file suit under 
ERISA. Therefore, she maintains that she is entitled to 
pursue her common law remedies without reference to, or 
reliance on, ERISA. 
 
In opposition, UNUM contends that Wolk's partnership 
status, though relevant to the question of whether she is a 
"participant" under the 1990 Policy, does not affect her 
status as a "beneficiary" under the plan. Thus, because 
Wolk receives benefits under the 1990 Policy, UNUM 
asserts that she must be subject to ERISA when pursing 
claims against the insurer. 
 
We have not ruled on the limited question of whether a 
partner-employer who shares coverage with employees 
under an "employee welfare benefit plan" qualifies as a 
"beneficiary" with standing to bring suit under ERISA. 
However, we believe ERISA's plain statutory language 
provides a clear answer. 
 
A. 
 
We must begin our analysis with an examination of 
ERISA's statutory language because " `absent a clearly 
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that 
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' " 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 
827, 835 (1990) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n 
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)); see also 
Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 
202 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[w]here the statutory language is plain 
and unambiguous, further inquiry is not required, except in 
the extraordinary case where a literal reading of the 
language produces an absurd result."). 
 
Under ERISA, "[a] civil action may be brought-- (1) by a 
participant or beneficiary -- (B) to recover benefits due to 
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him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under 
the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future 
benefits under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. 
S 1132(a)(1)(B). ERISA defines the term "participant" as "any 
employee or former employee of an employer . . . who is or 
may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an 
employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. S 1002(7). A "beneficiary" 
is a "person designated by a participant, or by the terms of 
an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to 
a benefit thereunder." 29 U.S.C. S 1002(8) (emphasis 
added). 
 
To reiterate, it is undisputed that the 1990 Policy 
qualifies as an employee benefit plan under ERISA. It also 
is undisputed that partners of Eckert Seamans are 
designated to receive benefits under the 1990 Policy -- 
indeed, Wolk applied for, and is currently receiving, benefits 
from UNUM pursuant to the 1990 Policy. Applying the plain 
language of the statue to these facts, Wolk fits squarely 
within the second category of ERISA's definition of a plan 
"beneficiary." Thus, we conclude that Wolk is a 
"beneficiary" under the 1990 Policy. 
 
We also find it significant that all of the Courts of Appeal 
that have analyzed the term "beneficiary" in a similar 
context have adopted this plain language interpretation. 
See, e.g., Engelhardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 
1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[physician's] claim for 
benefits under the policy confirms his status as a plan 
beneficiary."); Prudential Ins. Co. v Doe, 76 F.3d 206, 208 
(8th Cir. 1996) (shareholders of corporation were 
"beneficiaries" of ERISA plan because they were designated 
to receive benefits by the terms of the employee benefit 
plan); Peterson v. American Life & Health Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 
404, 409 (9th Cir. 1995) (partner was "beneficiary" under 
ERISA because "any person designated to receive benefits 
from a policy that is part of an ERISA plan may bring a civil 
suit to enforce ERISA"); Harper v. American Chambers Life 
Ins. Co., 898 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1990) (partner 
insured by policy that is part of an ERISA plan has 
standing to sue under ERISA as a "beneficiary").5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although Wolk cites to a number of Court of Appeals decisions where 
the court held that an employer did not have standing to sue under 
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Wolk contends that it would be contrary to the "clearly 
expressed legislative intention" of Congress for us to apply 
a plain language interpretation to section 1002(8). In 
particular, Wolk argues that such an interpretation is: (1) 
inconsistent with the use of the term "beneficiary" in the 
other provisions of ERISA; and (2) conflicts with ERISA's 
fundamental requirement that no plan asset may inure to 
the benefit of an employer. We disagree. 
 
With respect to her first argument, Wolk maintains that 
the term "beneficiary" is used throughout ERISA to refer to 
persons who are designated by participants to receive 
benefits. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. S 1001(b) (declaring it the 
policy of ERISA to protect "the interests of participants in 
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries"); 29 U.S.C. 
S 1002(1) (defining "employee welfare benefit plan" as a plan 
that is established or maintained "for the purpose of 
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries") 
(emphasis added in all). According to Wolk: 
 
       [i]f UNUM's interpretation were correct, the language 
       would read that an ERISA plan must provide for "its 
       participants or its beneficiaries." The only logical 
       reconciliation of these provisions is that the language 
       of the statute (referring to those designated to receive 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
ERISA, we believe these cases are distinguishable. More specifically, 
unlike the cases cited above, none of the decisions cited by Wolk 
engaged in an in-depth analysis of the term "beneficiary," nor did they 
address the same factual situation at issue here. See, e.g., Meredith v. 
Time Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 1993) (insurance plan 
purchased by sole proprietor, covering only herself and her spouse, did 
not constitute "employee welfare benefit plan"); Fugarino v. Hartford Life 
and Accident Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th Cir. 1992) (health 
insurance plan whose sole beneficiaries were company's owners cannot 
qualify as an "employee benefit plan" under ERISA; nor can employers 
qualify as "participants" of an ERISA plan); Kwatcher v. Massachusetts 
Service Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 959-60 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(ERISA's anti-inurement provision prohibits payments to employer from 
qualified pension plan); Giardono v. Jones , 867 F.2d 409, 411-12 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (sole proprietor cannot be "participant" of ERISA plan); 
Peckham v. Board of Trustees of the Int'l Brotherhood of Painters, 653 
F.2d 424, 426-27 (10th Cir. 1981) (ERISA's anti-inurement provision 
prohibits employers from participating in employee pension benefit 
plans). 
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       benefits "by the terms of an employee benefit plan") is 
       meant to encompass nothing more than a designation 
       supplied by the terms of the employee benefit plan in 
       lieu of a designation by the employee/participant. .. . 
       Therefore, the plain reading of the statute would 
       indicate that Congress understood "beneficiaries" to be 
       individuals designated by participants, or supplied by 
       operation of law in the absence of such designation. 
 
Appellant's Reply Brief at 5. 
 
We fail to see how Wolk's interpretation is the"only 
logical reconciliation" of ERISA's use of the term 
"beneficiary." At most, it is just another way that ERISA's 
definition of a plan "beneficiary" might be satisfied -- since 
persons designated by operation of law are, by definition, 
"designated by the terms of the plan." The fact that 
"beneficiary" is used in other provisions of ERISA to refer to 
the beneficiaries of a participant does not necessarily mean 
that the term was only intended to refer to such persons. 
In defining the term, Congress was careful to include a 
category for the designees of a participant as well as a 
category for those designated by the terms of an ERISA 
plan. See 29 U.S.C. S 1002(8). Were we to limit the second 
category to those designated by operation of law, we would 
be overstepping our bounds as a court of law. See Mohasco 
Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980) (stating that 
courts must "respect the compromise embodied in the 
words chosen by Congress. It is not our place simply to 
alter the balance struck by Congress in procedural statutes 
by favoring one side or the other in matters of statutory 
construction."). If Congress did not intend the phrase "by 
the terms of an employee benefit plan" to mean what it 
says, it is for Congress alone to correct. See Connecticut 
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) ("We 
have stated time and again that courts must presume that 
a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in 
a statute what it says there."). 
 
Moreover, there is second compelling reason for adopting 
a plain language interpretation of section 1002(8). As 
several courts of appeals have noted, "[t]o hold otherwise 
would create the anomaly of requiring some insureds to 
pursue benefit claims under state law while requiring 
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others covered by the identical policy to proceed under 
ERISA. Such a scenario would frustrate Congress's intent 
of achieving uniformity in the law governing employment 
benefits." Peterson, 48 F.3d at 409; see also Prudential, 76 
F.3d at 210; Madonia v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Virginia, 11 F.3d 444, 450 (4th Cir. 1993). We believe this 
rationale provides a logical explanation for why Congress 
chose to include persons designated "by the terms of an 
employee benefit plan" in the definition of"beneficiary." 
Accordingly, Wolk's argument is inadequate to overcome 
the statute's plain language. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 
508 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1993) ("vague notions of a statute's 
`basic purpose' are . . . inadequate to overcome the words 
of its text. . . . This is especially true with legislation such 
as ERISA, an enormously complex and detailed statute that 
resolved innumerable disputes between powerful competing 
interests . . . ." (citations omitted)). 
 
We also do not believe that the 1990 Policy invokes the 
concerns of ERISA's anti-inurement provision. See 29 
U.S.C. S 1103(c)(1). ERISA's anti-inurement provision is 
directed at plan assets -- i.e., "assets accumulating in trust 
and pension funds." Engelhardt, 139 F.3d at 1351. In 
Prudential, the court described the purpose of the anti- 
inurement provision as follows: 
 
       the legislative history involving the [anti-inurement 
       provision] indicates congressional concern over the 
       wrongful diversion of trust assets and the 
       administrative integrity of benefit plans. Section 
       1103(c)(1) and 29 U.S.C. S 1104(a) deal withfiduciary 
       duties for plan administrators and employers. Congress 
       included these provisions in order to make the law of 
       trusts applicable to the plans and to eliminate such 
       abuses as self-dealing imprudent investing, and 
       misappropriation of plan funds.  
 
Prudential, 76 F.3d at 209 (internal citations omitted). 
However, the present case does not implicate these 
concerns. The 1990 Policy was administered exclusively by 
UNUM. The extent of Eckert Seamans involvement was the 
processing of paperwork and the payment of premiums for 
its employees. UNUM made all of the substantive decisions 
regarding the eligibility or ineligibility of beneficiaries for 
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disability benefits, and paid all of the recovery benefits out 
of its own funds. In short, Eckert Seamans did not exercise 
the type of control over the funds used to pay out disability 
benefits under the 1990 Policy that gives rise to the 
concerns of the anti-inurement provision. Accordingly, we 
do not believe ERISA's anti-inurement provision is an 
appropriate basis for deviating from the plain language of 
the statute. 
 
III. 
 
Because there is nothing in ERISA to advise against 
applying the plain language of section 1002(8) to Wolk's 
claims, we hold that Wolk is a "beneficiary" with standing 
to bring suit under ERISA. As a result, Wolk's state-law 
claims against UNUM, which derive from the 1990 Policy, 
are preempted by section 1144(a). Accordingly, the District 
Court's order granting summary judgment in favor of 
UNUM and allowing Wolk to amend her complaint to assert 
a cause of action under ERISA will be affirmed. 
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